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Extremist exploitation of social media platforms is an important regulatory question for civil 
society, government, and the private sector (Crosset and Dupont 2018), mirroring existing 
discussions about platform governance in general (Gorwa 2019). Extremists exploit social 
media platforms, and the Internet more generally, for a range of reasons from spreading hateful 
narratives and propaganda to financing, recruitment, and sharing operational information (Gill 
et al. 2017). How best to counter such activity has recently been the focus of an emerging field 
of academic and policy debate (Aly et al. 2016, Braddock and Horgan 2016, Davies et al. 2016, 
Szmania and Fincher 2017, Helmus 2018, Ganesh and Bright 2020). While many extremists 
end up barred from social media at the discretion of hosting platforms (Citron 2018, Gillespie 
2018), often in discussion with government and law enforcement (Brocato 2015, Brown and 
Pearson 2018), significant attention is being paid to counter-messaging and other strategic 
communication techniques as potential responses (Briggs and Feve 2013, Bertram 2016, Beutel 
et al. 2016, Braddock and Horgan 2016, Cherney 2016, Brown and Marway 2018, Eerten et 
al. 2019). How best to respond to extremism on social media often centres on the vexing task 
of finding a balance between civil society, government, and private sector actors and a balance 
in regulating and moderating content on platforms and developing programmes to counter the 
narratives on which extremists thrive while being conscious of rights to free expression and 
the appropriateness of restrictions on speech. 
Policy responses to this question fit under two headings: strategic communication and 
content moderation. This issue focuses on one form of strategic communication, countering 
violent extremism (CVE) which we introduce in the following section (see Archetti, 2019). 
Content moderation, which is different than CVE though it affects extremist exploitation of 
social media, is a set of practices used by social media platforms to enforce their guidelines on 
acceptable content. As we describe below, there are emerging relationships across civil society, 
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government, and private sector actors in content moderation. At the centre of both of these 
policy responses is a calculation about how best to limit audience exposure to extremist 
narratives and maintain the marginality of extremist views. Extremists, meanwhile, seek to use 
social media to expand their reach, appear credible, and transgress this marginality. 
Challenging extremists on social media requires a variety of techniques, and increasingly relies 
on groups of stakeholders across civil society, and the private sector, rather than just 
government alone (Briggs and Feve 2013, Griffith-Dickson et al. 2014, Aly et al. 2015, 
Dalgaard-Nielsen 2016, Scrivens and Perry 2017, Brown and Marway 2018, Gielen 2019). 
Strategic communication and content moderation are two broad responses to consider in policy 
development to challenge extremist exploitation of social media. 
This issue collects five articles that develop multiple strands of research into the 
responses and solutions to extremist exploitation of social media. Through these five articles, 
we suggest an agenda for future research on how multi-stakeholder initiatives to challenge 
extremist exploitation of social media are conceived, designed, and implemented, and what 
challenges these initiatives need to surmount. 
 
Strategic Communication, Primary CVE, and Informal Actors 
Countering violent extremism (CVE) refers to a field of “soft power” mechanisms that try to 
counter extremists, and should be differentiated from counter-terrorism. CVE seeks to use 
“non-coercive” and “voluntary” activities designed to counter violent extremist ideology and 
attempts to provide opportunities for individuals to disengage with radicalising influences 
(Selim 2016, p. 95, Bjola and Pamment 2019, p. 7). Alongside working with local communities 
and supporting individuals, strategic communications is one of the key functions of CVE.1 
 
1 The US-led Global Engagement Centre, the UK Home Office’s RICU (Research, Information and Communications Unit), and the 
independent Hedayah Centre based in Abu Dhabi are well-known centres for CVE knowledge and practice, all of which ground CVE activity 
in strategic communications (Archetti 2019, pp. 85–86). 
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Many CVE programmes are funded by governments, but often delivered by civil society, such 
as the EU’s Civil Society Empowerment Programme, or the private sector as is the case in the 
UK (described below). Broadly, CVE initiatives incorporate contributions from civil society, 
governments, think tanks and non-profits, and the private sector.  
CVE activities can be conceptualised as primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary CVE 
seeks to reduce the likelihood of radicalisation across a population, secondary CVE focuses on 
those vulnerable to radicalisation, and tertiary CVE focuses on those already radicalised 
(Harris-Hogan et al. 2016, Gielen 2019, p. 1157). While secondary and tertiary CVE often 
involve state-run exit and deradicalization programmes, frequently making use of civil society 
practitioners and social workers, primary CVE focuses on challenging the spread of extremist 
narratives and inoculating audiences against them. The articles collected in this special issue 
offer new avenues for conceiving of primary CVE activities on and through social media, and 
explore how they can be refined by learning from previous CVE initiatives, informal CVE 
actors, and organic activity on platforms. 
In addition to civil society, think tanks, and the government, the private sector now 
plays an important role in primary CVE. First, social media platforms that extremists exploit 
have become key stakeholders in the governance of extremism. This means that Facebook, 
Twitter, and Alphabet/Google have become important actors in countering extremism on the 
platforms they run. For example, Facebook has developed in-house technologies and 
protocols,2 is working with civil society for counter-messaging and anti-hate work,3 and 
moderates content and suspends users where necessary.4 Second, the cultural industries—
particularly advertising, public relations, and media production—have been contracted by the 
state to produce counter-narrative content. A well-known example is the UK Home Office’s 
 




RICU contracting Breakthrough Media,5 a production company, to produce content that 
challenges violent jihadist narratives. The UK’s Home Office also contracted M&C Saatchi, a 
major advertising company, to manage a GBP 60 million account to develop CVE campaigns,6 
which has continued in the UK under the “Building a Stronger Britain Together” programme 
run by the Home Office.7 While it remains to be seen what effect this investment has had on 
preventing extremism and disrupting circuits of radicalisation, this is clear evidence that more 
stakeholders in the cultural industries are increasingly becoming involved in governance 
processes to counter extremist exploitation of digital media. Much of this work proceeds 
without significant academic scrutiny and evaluation, often with thin evidence that these 
initiatives are indeed as effective as they promise to be (Glazzard 2017, Archetti 2019, Awan 
et al. 2019). When used in conjunction with automated recommendation systems, they may 
even risk counter-productive effects (Schmitt et al. 2018, Bright et al. 2020). 
Of course, CVE has not primarily been focused on online initiatives, though many CVE 
service providers have recently increased their attention to extremist exploitation of social 
media. The first article in this special issue by Talene Bilazarian studies three cases of formal, 
offline CVE initiatives led by the state and third parties. Bilazarian argues that overt 
participation from a government may compromise the credibility of CVE activity (see also 
Neumann 2013, Ingram 2016, Belanger and Szmania 2018). She suggests that messages from 
third parties can alleviate these concerns about credibility. Third parties, she argues, are better 
placed to take advantage of existing network effects and use interactive features to increase the 
impact of CVE efforts. Bilazarian’s recommendation to focus on networked approaches, 
interpersonal messaging, and going beyond the narrow frame of counter-extremism when 







narratives and Chaudhry and Gruzd’s work in comment section racism on Facebook news 
pages. Where Bilazarian develops policy recommendations that can better guide online-
oriented CVE, Lee and Chaudhry and Gruzd provide a granular examination of the challenges 
facing primary CVE on and through social media. 
Given the increased participation of civil society, the private sector, and the cultural 
industries in CVE, Lee asks, “why would audiences listen to a word the counter messaging 
‘industry’ has to say?” (p. 2). Lee’s article shifts focus to informal counter messaging, 
understood as “spontaneous”, everyday expressions that are “inherent in societies” that 
“maintain the social prohibition on extreme ideas and behaviours” (p. 5-6). Such users are 
important to CVE efforts because they present independent, and possibly more ‘credible’ 
voices for counter-messaging (Coyer 2020).  
Turning to the experiences of informal counter-narrative practitioners, Lee concludes 
that their focus on satirising, criticising, and challenging extremist narratives contributes to 
primary CVE by reinforcing social prohibitions against such views in mainstream venues. 
Indeed, these informal mechanisms are more and more part of formal strategic 
communications. By identifying key challenges, particularly around ideology, motivation, and 
shared values, Lee reveals some of the challenges that will be faced in the future as relatively 
powerful actors continue employ civil society to take part in strategic communications intended 
to disrupt extremist use of digital media.  
Informal ensembles of users also play a role in primary CVE, though they cannot be 
classified as engaging in strategic communication. Rather, we can look to users on platforms 
as another set of informal actors challenging extremist narratives. Drawing on empirical 
research on thousands of comments on news stories about race, racism, or ethnicity on the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News Facebook page, Chaudhry and Gruzd focus on the 
“spiral of silence” which is a communication theory that “suggests that with increasing social 
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pressure, people may conceal their views when they think their views are in the minority” (see 
Noelle-Neumann 1991 in Chaudhry and Gruzd, p. 2). Though they suggest that the lack of 
anonymity on Facebook limits the extent of racist speech observed on the page they study, 
Chaudhry and Gruzd do find a vocal minority of users participating in racist speech. However, 
they also find that a sizable proportion of users take it upon themselves to counter racist 
narratives when they are expressed by other users on the page. This work expands on the 
possibilities and limits of ensembles of users participating in forms of primary CVE in an 
organic and self-directed fashion that is not typically associated with CVE efforts, providing 
crucial data on the possibilities and limits of incorporating such actors in efforts to engage in 
primary CVE. 
 
Content Moderation and Takedown 
Content moderation references another set of policy responses that are not forms of strategic 
communication or CVE. However, content moderation has an effect in the same fields in which 
primary CVE intervenes because content moderation involves decisions about decreasing the 
presence of extremist narratives or suspending exponents of extremist on a platform, thereby 
reducing the potential that audiences might be exposed to extremist narratives. Content 
moderation is done by social media platforms, who use large labour forces, often with acute 
effects on the mental health of precarious workers, and automated tools to identify extremist 
content, defined by each platforms’ own community guidelines (Gillespie 2018, Roberts 2019). 
Platforms are in charge of enforcing these guidelines and regularly remove content and block 
users that are in violation of guidelines that they have set on hate speech, inappropriate content, 
support or celebration of terrorism, or spam. 
This is a controversial area, but Conway et al. find that Twitter takedown of pro-IS 
accounts “severely affected IS’s ability to develop and maintain robust and influential 
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communities on Twitter” (Berger and Perez 2016, Conway et al. 2019, p. 152). On Reddit, 
users active on hate-based subforums that were shut down became active on other parts of 
Reddit, but their expression of hate, misogyny, and racism had decreased (Chandrasekharan et 
al. 2017). While taking down extremism may seem a logical approach, it can have counter-
productive outcomes. First, disruption on Twitter has led to the migration of pro-ISIS activity 
to encrypted messaging applications such as Telegram (Prucha 2016). Second, having faced 
suspension on Twitter and other social media platforms can be a badge of pride for extremists 
and plays a role in community-building among these networks (Pearson 2017). 
Content moderation also involves multiple stakeholders that include government 
(particularly law enforcement) and civil society. For example, Internet Referral Units run by 
police organizations such as Europol and London’s Metropolitan Police, play an important role 
in encouraging platforms to take down content (Chang 2017, Vieth 2019, Reeve 2020). Further, 
social media companies have developed their own relationship with specific civil society 
organisations that it has selected as ‘trusted flaggers’ of potentially extremist content (Fishman 
2019, p. 93). The Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) is a further 
development in this area, which involves a shared database of image fingerprints (or “hashes”) 
to enable rapid takedown of extremist content across platforms and websites. It also brings 
together multiple stakeholders and works with the UN, intergovernmental organisations, think 
tanks, and civil society (Gorwa 2019). More recently, there has been efforts across computer 
science and computational linguistics specialists in the academy and industry to develop 
reliable systems that can detect extremist expression on social media, using text mining, 
classification, and image recognition techniques (Djuric et al. 2015, Burnap and Williams 
2016, Rudinac et al. 2017, Borisyuk et al. 2018, Scrivens et al. 2018). The initiatives are 
occurring alongside the increase in private sector initiatives that use AI to detect and assist with 
moderation of extremist content (Gallacher 2020).  
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Research on emerging technologies in moderating extremist and terrorist content 
requires more attention. Given the high risks of incorrect flags that lead to takedown of 
innocent users and their content, auditing and evaluating AI approaches at use in content 
moderation is of significant concern, especially considering the demonstrable biases against 
women and minorities that studies of algorithms have revealed (Eubanks 2018, Noble 2018). 
While many projects have focused on how to detect extremist content, Hall et al. instead 
evaluate the performance of machines against human judgement, probing the limits of text-
based methods for the classification of extremism. They find that for jihadist content, 
approaches to detect extremist content with AI require significant work in integrating human 
understanding into machine abilities. While these approaches perform well for high-level 
concepts, humans provide more granular analysis that identifies key themes and forms of 
content, such as emotion. By engaging in a validation of open-source AI tools in detection of 
extremist content, Hall et al. provide valuable advancements in research design and 
methodology that can be applied for future study that probes the possibilities and limits of 
technical systems in primary CVE, identifying key challenges that software must surmount for 




Alternative Media Undermining Primary CVE 
While CVE practitioners are acutely aware of the broader networks of websites and blogs that 
form an alternative media ecosystem that provides an important resource for extremists, this 
ecosystem presents significant challenges in ensuring the viability of primary CVE activities. 
Research on disinformation, so-called “fake news”, and polarization on social media has 
highlighted the important roles played by users in spreading fake news (Vosoughi et al. 2018), 
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the unlikelihood of extremists engaging with others that represent rival ideologies (Bright 
2018), the higher likelihood of conservatives sharing stories from fake news domains (Guess 
et al. 2019), and the disproportionate role of radical right media in the spread of disinformation 
(Bennett and Livingston 2018). Recent work has stressed the central role that alternative 
media—such as Breitbart News and the social media use of far right social movements in North 
America and Western Europe—has had in spreading problematic information and reinforcing 
discriminatory, racist discourse and positions common to both the radical right and the extreme 
right (Benkler et al. 2018, Bennett and Livingston 2018, Marwick 2018).  
In exploiting social media, extremists are taking advantage of communication 
infrastructure, the specific affordances and cultures specific to certain platforms, media 
gatekeepers, and multiple networked audiences to whom they deliver content. Alternative 
media can be anti-democratic, repressive, and denigrating to out-groups while continuing to 
challenge hegemonic discourse in mainstream media (see p. 4 of Heft et al. in this issue). If a 
social prohibition on extremist views—jihadist, far right, or otherwise—is important to uphold, 
primary CVE should consider the extent to which alternative media networks exploit 
infrastructure, affordances, and different media systems to undermine this prohibition.  
The role of civil society, government, and social media platforms in addressing issues 
of disinformation and hyper-partisan alternative media is central to primary CVE; 
consequently, an engagement (offered by Heft et al. in this issue) is necessary to understanding 
what Marwick (2018) refers to as the sociotechnical systems in which racist, discriminatory, 
and hateful disinformation is mediated, potentially undermining primary CVE by legitimising 
and reinforcing forms of anti-immigrant, racist, and white supremacist discourse through 
alternative media networks between users, political actors, and a variety of creators active on 
platforms that are connected with participatory digital cultures on social media platforms 
(Lewis 2018, Marwick 2018, Hughes 2019, Munn 2019). 
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While public attention has shifted to ISIS media in recent years, jihadists have long 
developed news outlets, webforums, and networks to share training and technical manuals 
(Awan 2007, pp. 76–77, Hoskins et al. 2011, Archetti 2012, Conway et al. 2012). This 
alternative media network was part of a strategy to “break the media siege imposed on the jihad 
movement” (Ayman Al-Zawahiri in Awan 2007, p. 76). They developed techniques to enhance 
their legitimacy and appear as credible websites while exploiting cynicism and mistrust with 
Western news sources amongst audiences in the UK (2007, 78).  
In the past decade, production values of jihadist alternative media have increased 
considerably and were widely disseminated on social media platforms, helping to maintain 
their presence online (Fisher 2015, Al-Rawi 2018, Shehabat and Mitew 2018, Baele et al. 2019, 
Fisher et al. 2019, Winter 2019). However, recent efforts at platform governance involving 
governments, civil society, social media platforms and internet companies have had a 
significant effect on forcing jihadists off major platforms and applications (Conway et al. 
2019). While it is not clear that this has fully countered their ability to maintain a persistent 
jihadist alternative media network available on the surface web, it has made mainstream 
platforms less accessible to them. Moreover, platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube work with smaller platforms and other service providers to share data about jihadist 
content and automate pre-emptive content moderation, and more attention is expected to be 
paid to the extreme right, especially following the Christchurch Call to Action.8 
Jihadist alternative media have a very different relationship to platform governance 
than right-wing alternative media. Far right narratives are readily accessible on social media 
platforms and their exponents and audiences often benefit from legitimation from political 
representatives in Western democracies (see Benkler et al. 2018, Ch. 3). Platforms such as 




creators that confer legitimacy and credibility on these creators (Lewis 2020). This makes it 
much more difficult for a set of actors to act decisively to counter such content—if these 
narratives are repeated by elected representatives, how should social media platforms react to 
such content? As noted by Twitter employees in a recent article published by Vice News, 
targeting American white supremacists on the platform may also involve banning Republican 
politicians.9 Takedown efforts have been met with a significant backlash and so-called “alt-
tech” platforms have become a home for extremists banned from mainstream platforms, 
providing a relatively secure site for extremist narratives to circulate (Donovan et al. 2018). 
As the authors of the final contribution to this special issue note, alternative media on 
the political right “results in a combination of an anti-hegemonic impetus” and a wide range of 
both mainstream and extreme political positions, ranging from economic liberalism to nativism 
(p. 5). While research on far right exploitation of social media is increasing, much of this work 
focuses on representation, narratives, ideology, and discourse (Topinka 2018, Deem 2019, 
Froio and Ganesh 2019, Klein and Muis 2019, Richards 2019), as well as disinformation 
spreading from right-wing digital news to social media platforms and mainstream media 
(Marwick and Lewis 2017, Benkler et al. 2018, Bennett and Livingston 2018). Developing the 
context of such activity in comparative perspective, Heft et al. in this volume provide a 
thorough mapping of hyper-partisan outlets in right-wing digital news ecosystems in Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States that contributes a 
context for both of these lines of inquiry. The authors identify contextual factors in each 
country’s political and media system that has led to different configurations of right-wing 






The authors classify 70 websites in this alternative media system by various factors 
including their tendency (a measurement of how conventionally their site is structured versus 
how focused their site is on sensational right-wing topics), transparency, and advertising 
dependency. Heft et al. ultimately note that they find “different patterns of supply and demand, 
as well as distinct funding structures, organizational strategies, and thematic tendency” across 
all of the sites (p. 24). More importantly, they find that right-wing digital news is tending 
towards normalization, which “challenges digital news environments” because normalization 
makes it more difficult for audiences to differentiate hyper-partisan from regular news (p. 24). 
However, they also note the significance of transnational audiences; while there is significant 
heterogeneity in the news pages they explored, English-based right-wing digital news enjoys 
transnational audiences.  
While the media Heft et al. explore cannot be uniformly or uncontroversially referred 
to as extreme right, nor is it directly implicated in far right terrorism, they do demonstrate a 
number of significant trends relevant to the development of solutions to counter extremist 
exploitation of social media. By repeating nativist, xenophobic, anti-Muslim, anti-Semitic, and 
anti-establishment themes, right-wing alternative news create an environment in which non-
violent extremist subcultures can thrive (see Holt et al. 2017). While there is little research to 
prove that these non-violent extremist subcultures cause violence, it is clear that they provide 
a milieu in which extremist views are sanctioned, supported, and reinforced rather than 
challenged and marginalized. Thus, alternative news can media undermine efforts at primary 
CVE and must be understood as actors that present a challenge to both formal and informal 
counter-messaging. The last article in this special issue contributes an overview of challenges 
faced by attempts at governing extremist exploitation of social media and the key role that 
alternative media play in supporting and cultivating a milieu that degrades the social 




Research into extremist exploitation of social media is a rapidly-developing field, as is research 
into the design, development, and implementation of counter-measures. In this introduction, 
we have introduced the contested role between civil society, government, and the private sector 
in initiatives to counter extremist exploitation of social media. We argue that these three actors 
play an important role in primary CVE, particularly in terms of strategic communication and 
content moderation. Across our articles focused on strategic communication, we see that 
emphasis is placed on the potential of informal actors to challenge and reinforce social norms 
that reject extremist views. Turning to content moderation, a more blunt tool that enforces these 
norms, we find that the increased involvement of new technologies requires auditing and 
criticism to identify the reliability of automation in such a contentious, high-risk area. Finally, 
looking at the potential of alternative media to chip away at these social injunctions against 
extremism, we explore how the mapping of the right-wing alternative media across different 
countries reveals significant heterogeneity and the processes by which extremist views are 
normalized through alternative media. The five articles collected in this issue provide an initial 
foray into encouraging interdisciplinary research on the challenges, possibilities, and limits of 
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